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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AN INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO A
BLOOD TEST IN A PATERNITY SUIT- Little v. Streater, _
U.S.

-,

101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981).
INTRODUCTION

Modern courts frequently allow the use of blood grouping tests
in paternity cases. "There is now . . . practically universal and

unanimous judicial willingness to give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test exclusion of paternity."' A 1976
report developed jointly by the American Bar Association and the
American Medical Association confirmed the ability of blood
grouping tests to exonerate innocent putative fathers.'
Many states have developed statutes relating to the use of
blood grouping tests in paternity cases.3 The State of Connecticut
has such a statute which provides that a court, on motion of any
party, may order the parties to submit to blood grouping tests.'
The statute further provides that "the cost of making such tests
shall be chargeable against the party making the motion."' The
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
1. 1 S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 9.13 (1980).
2. Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell & Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines:
Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage,10 FAMILY L. Q. 247 (1976).
3. In 1979, North Carolina adopted a new paternity blood test statue, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See Note, The Use of Blood Tests in
Actions to Determine Paternity, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV.591 (1980) for a discussion on the improvements made in blood tests and an evaluation of the major
changes in this amended statute.
4. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-168 (1981).
5. In its entirety, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-168 (1981) states:
In any proceeding in which a question of paternity is an issue, the court,

on motion of any party, may order the mother, her child and the putative
father or the husband of the mother to submit to one or more blood
grouping tests, to be made by a qualified physician or other qualified
person, designated by the court, to determine whether or not the putative father or the husband of the mother can be excluded as being the
father of the child. The results of such tests shall be admissible in evidence only in cases where such results establish definite exclusion of the
putative father or such husband as such father. The costs of making such
tests shall be chargeable against the party making the motion.
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this Connecticut provision in Little v. Streater. The Court held
that the Connecticut statute, denying a defendant blood grouping
tests because of his lack of financial resources, violated the due
process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 In a unanimous
decision, the Court concluded the statute, requiring the party requesting blood grouping tests to pay for such tests, was a denial of
an indigent's opportunity to be heard.'
THE CASE

On May 21, 1975, plaintiff Gloria Streater, while unmarried,
gave birth to a female child. Because the child was a recipient of
public assistance, Connecticut law required Streater to disclose the
name of the putative father. Streater identified defendant Walter
Little as the child's father. The Department of Social Services provided an attorney for Streater, and she brought a paternity suit
against Little to establish his liability for the child's support. At
the time the paternity action was commenced, Little was incarcerated in the Connecticut Correctional Institution. Little moved to
order blood grouping tests on plaintiff and her child pursuant to
state statute. 10 Little asserted that he was indigent and asked that
the State be ordered to pay for the tests. The trial court granted
the motion to order blood grouping tests but denied the request
that they be furnished at the State's expense. Because Little could
not pay for the blood grouping tests, none were performed. The
paternity suit was tried and both Streater and Little testified at
trial. The trial court found that Little was the child's father, entered judgment against him and ordered him to pay child
support."
On appeal, the Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior
Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in an unreported per
curiam opinion and held that Connecticut's blood test statute did
6. -U.S.-, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981).
7. Id. at-, 101 S. Ct. at 2203.

8. Id.
9. Connecticut law compelled her, upon penalty of fine and imprisonment for
contempt "to disclose the name of the putative father under oath and to institute

an action to establish the paternity of said child." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-169
(1981).

§ 46b-168 (1981).
11. -U.S. at, 101 S. Ct. at 2203. The damages of $6,974.48 included the
"lying-in" expenses of plaintiff and the child, "accrued maintenance" through October 31, 1978 and the "costs of suit plus reasonable attorney's fees."
10. CONN. GEN. STAT.
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not violate the due process and equal protection rights of an indigent defendant in a paternity proceeding."2 Little then petitioned
for certification to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Certification
was denied.1 3 The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction," held the Connecticut statute violated Fourteenth Amendment due process, reversed the judgment and remanded the case.' 5
BACKGROUND

The number of illegitimate children born in the United States
is staggering and is on the rise. Not only has there been an increase
in the number of illegitimate births, but the rate has also been accelerating." Possibly in response to this increase and the consequent problems, Congress enacted Section 602(a)(26)(B) of Title
42 of the United States Code. The act requires that states provide
programs to undertake to establish the paternity of and secure
support for children born out of wedlock. Another act of Congress
provides for paterniy determination services which are available
7
upon request for a reasonable fee.1
In regard to this same problem, the Connecticut Legislature
enacted a chapter relating to paternity matters.'8 In particular, the
statutes state that courts may order blood tests when paternity is
in dispute" and compel the mother of a child who is a recipient of
public assistance to disclose the name of the putative father and
institute an action to establish the paternity of the child.' 0
12. Appellate Session relied on its prior decision in Ferro v. Morgan, 35
Conn. Supp. 679, 406 A.2d 873, cert. denied, 177 Conn. 753, 399 A.2d 526 (1979),
in which, with a similar fact situation and identical issue, the Superior Court of
Connecticut had upheld CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-168 (1981). The Superior Court
overruled a trial court order that the cost of blood tests be paid by the state. The
Superior Court held that requiring a putative father to bear costs of blood tests
did not violate due process, indicating that defendant had meaningful opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. The apparent rationale behind the court's
holding seemed to be that blood grouping tests are not very reliable and, therefore, are not of crucial importance.
13. 180 Conn. 756, 414 A.2d 199 (1980).
14. -U.S.-, 101 S. Ct. 350 (1980).
15. -U.S. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2211.
16. See Miale, supra note 2, at 249.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(A), (B) (1976).
18. Chapter 815y (1979).

19.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 46b-168 (1981).

20. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-169 (1981).
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The nature of paternity actions in Connecticut places an unusual evidentiary burden on a defendant. A defendant is permitted
to testify in his own behalf in paternity actions; according to the
statute, however, "if such mother or expectant mother continues
constant in her accusation, it shall be evidence that the respondent
is the father of such child.""1 In a 1971 decision, 2 the Connecticut
Supreme Court indicated that a prima facie case made out by the
mother places upon the reputed father the burden of showing his
innocence. 23 The reputed father must show his innocence by evi-

dence other than his own testimony. 2 ' Thus, a defendant in a paternity action in Connecticut is placed at a disadvantage in that
his testimony alone is insufficient to overcome the plaintiff's prima
facie case.'
Although blood tests were first admitted into evidence in
American courts in the 1930s, blood grouping tests in paternity
proceedings have only been used with frequency during the last
decade. 2 6 Recent improvements in these tests have made them
more reliable. According to a 1976 joint ABA-AMA report, the correct use of blood test systems provides a 91-93% cumulative
probability of negating paternity for erroneously accused men."'
The present reliability of the systems indicates the probable value
of blood tests results in paternity cases.2 8
As the accuracy of blood grouping tests improved, and as the
use of these tests increased, states began to enact statutes providing for and regulating the use of blood tests. Connecticut's statutes
provide that the court may order the mother, the child, and the
putative father to submit to blood grouping tests and that the results of such tests are admissible in evidence if the results establish
definite exclusion of the putative father.2 Connecticut's provisions

are similar to those of other states. But unlike most other statutes,
Connecticut's law mandates that the "costs of making such tests
shall be chargeable against the party making the motion."'"
21. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-160 (1981).
22. Kelsaw v. Green, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 516, 276 A.2d 909 (1971).
23. Id. at 519-520, 276 A.2d at 911-912.

24. Id.
25. -U.S. aL-, 101 S. Ct. at 2208.
26. See Note, supra note 3.

27. See Miale, supra note 2, at 257.
28. -U.S. at-, 101 S. Ct. at 2206.
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-168 (1981).
30. Id. Note that North Carolina also requires defendants requesting blood
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/7
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Prior to the 1970s, indigents were seldom afforded access to
civil proceedings. Then in 1971, the United States Supreme Court,
in Boddie v. Connecticut,3' held that due process forbids a state
from denying access to its court to indigents who in good faith seek
judicial dissolution of their marriage. The parties in Boddie, welfare recipients residing in Connecticut, were unable to bring their
divorce actions in the Connecticut courts because they were unable
to pay the $60 cost of bringing an action for divorce. The Court
held that persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty
through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 8
ANALYSIS

In Little v. "Streater,the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a statute which denied a defendant blood grouping tests because of
his lack of financial resources." The Court concluded that the statute, requiring a party who requested blood tests to pay for the
tests, was a denial of an indigent's opportunity to be heard. Using
an analysis indicated in Matthews v. Eldridge, the Court determined that Connecticut's statute violated the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The three elements to be considered in a Matthews analysis are: (1) the private interests at
stake; (2) the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous
results and the probable value of the suggested procedural safeguard; and, (3) the governmental interests affected."
After applying a Matthews analysis, the Court found that defendant had been deprived of due process. The private interests
were found to be substantial. The putative father's pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support obligation was important
tests in paternity proceedings "to initially be responsible for any of the expenses
thereof." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1(b)(2) (Cure. Supp. 1979).
31. 401 U.S. 371 at 374-383 (1971).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 377. See also Note, Divorce-Indigent'sRight to Avoid Payment of
Filing Fees, 26 ARK. L. REV. 87, 90 (1972), in which the author comments, "The
Court obviously felt that the right of access to the courts in a divorce action was
one of those fundamental rights necessary to our system of justice that was guaranteed all citizens and made applicable to the states by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment."
34. -U.S. at-, 101 S. Ct. at 2211.
35. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
36. Id. at 335.
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in itself. In addition, paternity proceedings have quasi-criminal
overtones in Connecticut. 7 The Court also indicated that familial
bonds are important and should be accorded constitutional protection. 8 Finally, both the child and the defendant in a paternity action have a compelling interest in the accuracy of such a
determination."'
In considering the risk that the procedures used in a Connecticut paternity action will lead to erroneous results, the Court determined that the risk that an indigent defendant will be erroneously
adjudged the father is considerable because of the usual absence of
witnesses in a paternity proceeding, the self-interest coloring the
testimony of the litigants, and the refusal of the state to pay for
blood grouping tests.40 Furthermore, because of the recognized accuracy with which blood grouping tests "definitively exclude a high
percentage of falsely accused putative fathers,""' the availability at
trial of blood tests results is a valuable procedural safeguard.,"
The governmental interests in Little were conflicting. Little
argued that, unlike a common dispute between private parties, the
State's involvement was considerable, giving rise to a constitutional duty.4' A state has a legitimate interest in the welfare and
support of a child born out of wedlock who is receiving public assistance, and an interest in an accurate and just determination of
paternity." A state also has a financial interest in avoiding the expense of blood grouping tests."s
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-171 (1981) provides that if a putative father is
found guilty, his subsequent failure to comply with the court's support order is
punishable by imprisonment. Note, however, that a paternity action itself does
not result in imprisonment.
38. - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2209. The Supreme Court in earlier decisions
has indicated the importance of familial bonds. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1976), where a father was given an interest in his non-marital child's custody
and adoption. See also Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,

-

U.S.

-,

49

U.S.L.W. 4586 (1981), where the Court held that the termination of familial
bonds demands procedural fairness.
39. Id. at

-,

101 S. Ct. at 2209.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2207. Since the child was a recipient of public
assistance, the State's Attorney General automatically became a party to the action. Burger, C.J., indicated that, "state action has undeniably pervaded this
case."
44. Id. at

-

101 S. Ct. at 2209.

45. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/7
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Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Connecticut's monetary interest was not significant enough to overcome the important
private interests involved."' States are entitled to reimbursement
from the federal government for 75% of the funds they expend on
operation of approved child support plans, including the development of evidence regarding paternity.47 Furthermore, numerous
other states advance the expenses of blood grouping tests for an
indigent and then tax these expenses as costs to the parties."
The highest courts of Colorado, Massachusetts, and West Virginia have held that under their respective state constitutions and
the United States Constitution, putative fathers may not be denied
access to blood grouping tests on the basis of indigency. 4" In addition, several states have statutes by which blood grouping tests can
be made available to indigents. 50
The fact that the child in Little was a recipient of public assistance and the fact that the State paid the fees for the plaintiff's
attorney appears to have influenced the Court's decision. Chief
Justice Burger indicated that the state is "responsible for an imbalance between the parties."51
The onerous evidentiary burden of a defendant in a Connecticut paternity action, coupled with the denial of the evidence of
blood tests, which in effect forecloses a potentially conclusive
means for a defendant to exonerate himself, appeared to have
weighed heavily in the Court's evaluation of the competing interests in Little.5 2 The Court held that Little lacked a meaningful op46.

-

U.S. at

-,

101 S. Ct. at 2210.

47. 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1) (1976 ed. and Supp. III) and regulations under 42
U.S.C. § 1302.
48. See ARK. REV. STAT. § 34.705.1 (1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-132 (1974);
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:397.1 (West Supp. 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522:3 (1974);
OiE REV. STAT. § 109.256.(1) (1979); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 42-6135 (Purdon
Supp. 1981); TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 13.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
49. See Franklin v. District Court, 194 Colo. 189, 527 P.2d 1072 (1977) (U.S.
Constitution); Commonwealth v. Possehl, 355 Mass. 575, 246 N.E.2d 667 (1969)
(U.S. Constitution and Massachusetts Constitution); State ex rel. Graves v.
Dougherty, 266 S.E.2d 142 (W.Va. 1980) (U.S. Constitution and West Virginia
Constitution).
50. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-12-5 (1977); D.C. CODE § 16-2343 (Supp. V
1978); MD. ANN. CODE § 16-66a (Supp. 1980); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.716(c) (1968).
51. - U.S. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2208.
52. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2210.
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portunity to be heard.53
The Little holding, following the rationale of Boddie, indicates
a trend toward allowing indigents greater access to civil proceedings. The provision of legal counsel to indigents in paternity proceedings would seem to be the next logical step. While the Supreme Court has not yet made such a finding, the highest courts of
four states have recognized the right of indigent defendants in paternity suits to counsel.5 4 These courts based their decisions on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact
that counsel for the plaintiff was supplied by the State."
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, based on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the North Carolina
Constitution, held in Wake County ex rel. Carringtonv. Townes,"
that an indigent defendant has a right to appointed counsel in paternity suits instituted by the State. The court noted the Little
holding and decided the case using some of the same rationale followed in Little. The defendant's liberty, property, and familial interests were balanced against the State's interests. The Court concluded, ". . . counsel for the indigent defendant is essential to his
' 7
having a meaningful opportunity to be heard.' 5
In deciding Little, the Supreme Court has announced a procedural requirement clearly applicable to North Carolina." By requiring all defendants who request blood tests in paternity proceedings to initially be responsible for the cost of the tests, North
Carolina, like Connecticut, may be denying indigents in paternity
53. Id.
54. Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1973); Salas v. Cortez, 24
Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 209 (1979);
Artibee v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 243 N.W.2d 248 (1966); Hepfel
v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1979).
55. 569 P.2d at 801-802, 24 Cal. 3d at 26-27, 593 P.2d at 229-230, 154 Cal.
Rptr. at 532-534; 397 Mich. at 56-57, 243 N.W.2d at 249-250.
56. - N.C. App. -, 281 S.E.2d 765 (1981).
57. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 773.

58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Upon receipt of a motion to compel blood tests and the entry of an order for blood tests, the court
shall proceed as follows: "By requiring the plaintiff, alleged-parent defendant or
other interested party requesting blood tests ...to initially be responsible for any
of the expenses thereof and upon the entry of a verdict of parentage or non-parentage, by taxing the expenses of blood tests ...as costs. . .

."

Note that North

Carolina's statute, unlike Connecticut's, provides that the expense of the blood
tests will be taxed as costs. However, the party requesting the tests must pay for
them initially. If the requesting party is an indigent, he still may be denied the
right to the blood tests.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/7
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proceedings the due process opportunity to be heard. While the
precise issue has not yet been litigated in this state, some change
in the North Carolina statute seems necessary to provide the constitutional guarantees recognized in Little. While not addressing
the issue of providing indigent North Carolina defendants with
free blood grouping tests, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
Wake County, did recognize that Little held an indigent defendant
who faces the State in a paternity suit has, upon demand, a constitutional right to a free blood grouping test.69 The court added, "...
an indigent defendant's right to a free blood grouping test may be
rendered meaningless without counsel to advise him of his right to
demand such a test, to explain the test's significance, to ensure
that the test is properly administered and to ensure that the results are properly admitted into evidence." 60
Wake County indicates that North Carolina, in line with several other states, is moving towards providing indigents greater access to the courts.
CONCLUSION

Little struck down a Connecticut statute which required even
an indigent party who requested blood tests in a paternity proceeding, to pay the costs of the test. The Supreme Court held that
the application of the Connecticut statute to indigents violated the
due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The holding in Little is consistent with the Court's earlier decision of Boddie, in providing indigents greater access to civil proceedings. The
Court put strong emphasis on familial bonds and showed a concern
for the plight of indigents in securing protection of their constitutional guarantees. A continued trend in this direction is likely considering the recent decisions of several state courts. A liberal extension of Little might lead to greater access for indigents to other
types of civil proceedings. Without state imposition of barriers, indigents would be afforded the same opportunity to utilize the
courts as the more affluent. •
Finally, as one court indicated, "unless the rights of indigent

59. - N.C. App. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 771.
60. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 771.
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defendants are protected, courts risk finding not the right man,
6
but simply the poorest man to be the father of the child."'
BarbaraHollingsworth

61. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d at 30, 595 P.2d at 232, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
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